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This paper investigates the dynamic consequences of demographic change and various
pension reform scenarios for Austria. The analysis is based on a computable
overlapping generations model with life-cycle labor supply, savings, and search
unemployment. The public sector is decomposed into general government and an
unfunded pension system with a tax benefit linkage. Our quantitative analysis
considers several pension reform scenarios on top of the demographic transition in an
aging society. We find that lowering the pension replacement rate and increasing the
retirement age can have strong labor market effects. They strengthen labor supply both
in terms of job search intensity, leading to lower unemployment rates, and hours
worked.
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Pension reform has important economy wide repercussions. In particular, it is expected
to aﬀect labor market performance. Depending on the extent of the tax beneﬁtl i n k ,
contributions to a PAYG system partly have tax character. The return to contributions
depends on population and productivity growth and, therefore, is lower than the real
interest rate in a dynamically eﬃcient economy. Thus, contributions tend to be actuarially
unfair from an individual perspective, and are partly perceived as taxes. Distorting labor
taxes, in turn, restrict labor demand and are a source of unemployment.
Like in most industrial countries, aging of the population puts formidable pressure on
the pension system. Given current pension rules, contribution rates would have to rise
quite impressively to fund the system. Since these contributions have partly tax character,
this secular rise adds to the overall labor tax burden with potentially detrimental eﬀects on
labor market performance. Cutting pensions may help to stabilize statutory contribution
rates. Lower statutory rates translate into lower eﬀective tax rates and thereby help to
reduce the labor market distortion. On the other hand, pension cuts imply a lower rate
of return and thereby a higher implicit tax component of given contribution levels. A
similar argument applies to an increase in the average retirement age which is often seen
as a solution to the aging problem.
Given the empirical evidence on the detrimental eﬀects of taxes on labor supply and
unemployment [see Daveri and Tabellini (2000), for example], it seems very important to
carefully investigate the labor market eﬀects of pension reform in a suﬃciently detailed
model of the labor market. This is then the main novel contribution of the paper which
applies a detailed model of labor supply, including demographic eﬀects, job search in-
tensity and hours worked, to investigate potential quantitative eﬀects of pension reform.
Equilibrium unemployment results from endogenously determined labor market tightness
which reﬂects both the job search intensity of unemployed workers and job creation by
ﬁrms. With this framework at hand, we investigate the consequences of some often dis-
cussed and important measures to protect the ﬁnancial viability of the pension system:
3raising contribution rates, raising average retirement age and cutting pension levels.
Pension reform is the subject of a considerable literature by now (see, for example,
the recent reviews by Bovenberg 2003 and Lindbeck and Persson 2003) but most of it has
reduced labor market distortions to a classical labor supply decision with full employment
(e.g. Homburg 1990, Breyer and Straub 1993, Fenge 1995, Brunner 1996, Lindbeck and
Persson 2003), or have considered other issues in a market clearing framework such as
retirement decisions, fertility, mobility of labor and political economy (e.g. Sinn 2000,
Casamatta, Cremer and Pestiau 2001, Feldstein 2001, Diamond 2003). Corneo and Mar-
quardt (2000) and Demmel and Keuschnigg (2000) studied the eﬀects of pension reform
on unemployment with union wage setting. These papers are less detailed in terms of
individual labor market incentives. Further, they do not provide any quantitative eﬀects
of pension reform during a demographic transition. The existing simulation studies also
do not allow to consider the eﬀects of pension reform on unemployment (see e.g. Kotlikoﬀ,
Smetters and Walliser 2001, Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter 2002, Morrow and Roeger
2004, Jensen, Lau and Poutvaara 2003 and Fehr, Jokisch and Kotlikoﬀ 2003). Jensen et
al. consider the implications of pension reform for human capital formation. Given high
unemployment in Austria and even more so in other European countries, it seems rather
important to investigate how pension reform aﬀects structural unemployment.
Our tool of analysis is a numerically solved general equilibrium model with overlapping
generations (OLG) of workers and retirees. It is an extension of Gertler’s (1999) life cycle
model where agents move stochastically into retirement, and once in retirement, face
a constant risk of extinction. This extension of the basic OLG model with life-time
uncertainty (pioneered by Blanchard, 1985) is not only more realistic in terms of its
demographic structure and life-cycle features. It also opens up new applications with
aging, labor markets and ﬁscal policy. Morrow and Roeger (2004) apply this framework
to investigate the eﬀects of demographic transition and pension reform in Europe. Our
own contribution is to model the pension system in more detail than these authors, and
4to incorporate endogenous labor supply combined with search unemployment.1 This
extension is important to capture the potential labor market distortions of pension reform.
Labor supply is speciﬁc to the employment state. Instead of enjoying leisure, workers may
opt for more income and consumption by either working more if employed or searching
for a job if unemployed. At any given date of time, increased search eﬀort raises one’s
probability of ﬁnding a job and thereby allows to earn income faster than otherwise. The
other aspects of the model such as private sector investment and the nature of the ﬁscal
systems are more straightforward. The model is calibrated to Austrian data.2
The paper is organized as follows. The next section brieﬂy describes the main features
of the Austrian pension system and its problems with long-run sustainability in the light
of projected population aging. Section 3 presents our tool of analysis. Section 4 discusses
simulation results relating to our policy scenarios: aging, lower pension entitlements, and
higher retirement age. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Aging and Pension Reform in Austria
2 . 1 A nO v e r v i e wo ft h eP e n s i o nS y s t e m
Austria has a generous and expensive pay as you go (PAYG) pension system with a weak
tax beneﬁt linkage. Public pension expenditures represent about 14.5% of GDP in 2000,
compared to 9.9% in 1970. They are much higher than the EU average of 10.4% of GDP
(European Commission, 2001). Contributions to the pension system are not suﬃcient
to cover total pension expenditure. The government must pay considerable transfers
out of general tax revenues to ﬁnance the deﬁc i to ft h ep e n s i o ns y s t e m . T h ec u r r e n t
1Our model integrates search unemployment as in Pissarides (2000) with well speciﬁed intertemporal
savings and investment decisions much as in the literature on unemployment and growth (see, for example,
Aghion and Howitt 1994, Andolfatto 1996, Merz 1999, or Shi and Wen 1997, 1999).
2Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2003) provide a detailed model documentation including the calibration
procedure. This separate technical appendix is available upon request.
5deﬁcit is 2.5% of GDP for the PAYG pension scheme. This translates into the fact that
individual pension claims are only partly ﬁnanced by own contributions and, thus, include
a considerable lump-sum component. Reﬂecting this imbalance, Koman, Keuschnigg and
Lüth (2002) have calculated that the unfunded future pension obligations amount to an
implicit debt of approximately 200% of GDP.
The funding gap is mostly due to the fact that pension expenditures have grown
quite substantially over the last decades. Over the period 1970-2000, the ratio of retirees
(i.e., the number of retirees per 1000 contributors) increased by 27% while the absolute
number of pensioners grew by more than 50%. Moreover, the average actual retirement
age declined considerably as people opted for early retirement in much greater numbers.
The statutory minimum age requirement is 60 for women and 65 for men, and 65 for civil
servants (Beamte). However, only about 10 percent of the population between the ages of
sixty and sixty-ﬁve is in the labor force. The average retirement age in the PAYG sector
scheme was 58.5 for men and 56.8 for women in 2000, down from 61.9 and 61.4 in 1970.
This is a consequence of early retirement and disability pensions becoming very popular
over the last decades: in 1999, only 15% of new pensions were regular old-age pensions,
about half the share in 1970 (IMF, 2002).
In a recent study of the Austrian pension system, Hofer and Koman (2001) argue
that the sharp drop in labor force participation among the elderly is the result of strong
disincentives of the Austrian pension system. The authors quantify the incentives to
retire early by computing measures of social security wealth and of the implicit tax rates
on continued work generated by the current system. They ﬁnd the tax on continued
work to become signiﬁcant after the early retirement age. With these trends, labor force
participation rates at older ages are now among the lowest in EU countries: between the
ages of sixty and sixty-ﬁve, only about 10 percent of the population is in the labor force.
The recent ﬁscal consolidation and pension reforms contained measures addressing the
pension system, mainly by discouraging early retirement which was made ﬁnancially less
attractive (see Keuschnigg et al., 2000). The required contribution period was extended
6and full pensions were made available only after the 60th year. To compute beneﬁts, a
maximum gross replacement rate of 80% is applied for the PAYG pension scheme. The
beneﬁts depend on the retirement age, the number of contribution periods and on the
average income over of the best 18 contribution years.
2.2 Aging and Long-Run Sustainability
Like other developed countries, Austria will experience a signiﬁcant aging of her popula-
tion over the next 50 years. Increasing life-expectancy, combined with very low fertility
rates are responsible for this trend. Eurostat (1999) forecasts an increase in life expectancy
at birth from 75 (males) and 81.2 (females) in 2000 to 81 and 86, respectively, in 2050.
Fertility rates are expected to increase from 1.34 to 1.5 over the same period (see Table
1). As a result, the ratio of elderly (older than 65) to people of working age (age 15-64)
will more then double, i.e. it will increase from 0.23 to 0.5 in 2050, while the share of
very old people (older than 79) will rise even more (IMF, 2002 and Statistik Austria).3
Table 1: Demographic Projections for Austria
Year 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Old-age dependency ratio∗ 229 265 310 407 478 489
Overall dependency ratio∗∗ 474 478 527 634 703 716
Share of very elderly∗∗∗ 234 274 277 278 307 389
Life expectancy at birth (years) 78.3 79.7 81.1 82.8 83.6 84.5
Life expectancy at age 65 (years) 17.9 18.8 19.7 20.8 21.4 22.1
Migration balance (thousands) 17.272 16.358 18.808 21.296 22.694 24.005
Total fertility rate∗∗∗∗ 1.34 1.44 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
* 65+/(15 bis 64), per thousands; ** (0 bis 14) + 65+/(15 bis 64) per thousands;
*** 80+/65+ per thousands, share of very elderly in total elderly population; ****
Number of live births per female. Source: Statistik Austria
3As a share of the total population, the weight of those older than 64 is expected to rise from currently
15.5% to 28.5% in 2050 (EC, 2002).
7As a result of population aging, all old-age related expenditures will increase, putting
pressure on the ﬁnances of the welfare system and threatening the long-run ﬁscal sustain-
ability. Public pension spending is expected to increase quite remarkably over the next
decades, reaching 17% of GDP in 2050. Apart from demographic developments, three
other factors are likely to inﬂuence the expected increase in pension spending: the share
of working people in employment, the share of elderly receiving pensions, and the generos-
ity of pension beneﬁts. Given the expected decline in employment, government is likely to
collect less revenues from taxes and social security contributions. A higher employment
rate of older workers would have a double ﬁscal dividend: it would increase the number
of contributors and decrease the number of people claiming pension beneﬁts. Any reform
that targets an improvement in women’s and elderly’s labor force participation as well as
lowering beneﬁts is likely to alleviate some of the spending pressure.
To sum up, future developments of pension expenditure will be determined by four
driving forces: aging, employment, eligibility, and beneﬁt rules. Decomposing overall pen-
sion expenditure and projecting each of these four parts separately, IMF (2002) arrives at
an estimate of future pension spending in Austria as a share of GDP (see, in particular,
Eskesen, 2002).4 The pension reform scenarios as discussed in Austria can also be re-
lated to these four components. The various reform proposals essentially boil down to (1)
making pensions less generous, resulting in a lower average replacement rate, (2) raising
eﬀective retirement age, and (3) strengthening incentives for increased labor force par-
ticipation and employment to further reduce the retiree worker ratio. In our framework,
aging (based on fertility and mortality assumptions) and employment are an endogenous
outcome rather than exogenously projected. Furthermore, the labor market incentives of
pension reform are not independently chosen but are endogenously determined by labor
taxes and contribution rates as required to sustain the solvency of the pension system
4The Austrian authorities recently set up a Committee on Long-Term Pension Sustainability (“Kom-
mission zur langfristigen Pensionssicherung”). The ﬁrst report of the committee published in May 2000
includes similar long-run projections and emphasizes, in particular, the need to increase employment
rates to stabilize the system.
8and of general government.
3 A Life Cycle Economy With Pensions
We model Austria as a small open economy with an internationally ﬁxed real interest rate
and exogenous trend growth of labor productivity. Asset and physical capital accumula-
tion reﬂect the intertemporal consumption and investment decisions of forward looking
agents. Households save to ensure smooth consumption in the face of uneven life-cycle in-
come patterns and, in particular, to top up public pensions and sustain their consumption
level during retirement. The life-cycle is divided into a working and retirement period.
During the working period, agents endogenously supply labor in terms of hours worked
when employed, and time spent on job search when unemployed. Retirement terminates
the ﬂow of wage income and, instead, entitles to pension beneﬁts. Although pensions
are earnings related, the contributions to the PAYG system are partly perceived as taxes
s i n c et h e ye a r nar a t eo fr e t u r nl e s st h a nt h em a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t e .S i n c et h i si m p l i c i tt a x
rate is part of the overall labor tax burden, it is particularly important to meaningfully
capture labor market eﬀects of pension reforms.5
The pattern of birth and mortality rates mimics the projections for demographic
change. The model replicates the continued increase in the retiree worker ratio which
is the source of the pension problem and dictates the much discussed changes to the sys-
tem. Aging itself may have profound consequences for labor market performance since
it aﬀects the inﬂows and outﬂows of workers from the aggregate labor force. Finally, we
include in much detail the separate budgets of the public sector and the pension system.
5Gertler (1999) introduced the life-cycle structure into the basic Blanchard (1985) model. The method-
ological contribution of this paper relative to the Blanchard-Gertler model is to allow for endogenous labor
supply and search unemployment and to eﬀectively compute the implicit tax rate of the pension system
as part of household optimization. See the separate technical appendix by Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg
(2003). See Heijdra, Keuschnigg and Kohler (2003) for some analytical results on the equilibrium unem-
ployment rate in the reduced model without retirement.
9The modeling of the pension system also includes the individually perceived tax beneﬁt
link, allowing us to calculate the implicit tax component of mandatory contributions.
3.1 Overlapping Generations
3.1.1 Demographics
The population consists of NW
t workers and NR
t retirees, hence total population is Nt =
NW
t +NR
t . These groups are themselves composed of diﬀerent age cohorts that are indexed
by their date of birth, e.g. NW
v,t i st h em a s sa td a t et of workers born at date v ≤ t.T h es i z e
of a cohort shrinks over time by NW
v,t = ωNW
v,t−1 since only a fraction ω<1 of them remains
active until next period while the other part is retired at a constant, age independent rate
1−ω. From an individual perspective, 1−ω is the probability of a worker becoming retired
next period. Starting with retirement, agents are subject to a constant, age independent
mortality rate 1 − γ and will thus survive to the next period only with probability γ.
Hence, the mass of any given retired cohort shrinks by NR
v,t = γNR
v,t−1.T o k e e p t h e
population groups constant, an inﬂow of new workers NW
t,t must replace the outﬂow into
retirement and, similarly, new retirees NR
t,t must replace the outﬂow on account of death.
By deﬁnition, the outﬂo wo fw o r k e r sm u s tb ee q u a lt ot h ei n ﬂo wo fn e wr e t i r e e sa si n










t,t =( 1 − ω)NW
t−1,
(d) Nt = Nt−1 + NW
t,t − (1 − γ)NR
t−1.
(1)
In specifying the retirement and mortality rates and choosing an appropriate birth rate,
the model can approximate various demographic scenarios.
103.1.2 Life-Cycle Optimization
Preferences are expressed by a CES expected utility function as proposed by Farmer
(1990) and Weil (1990). A retired person chooses consumption CR
v,t to maximize expected















,σ C =1 /(1 − ρ), (2)
where β is a subjective discount factor, γ is the instantaneous probability of survival, and
σC is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Her optimal policy is to spend
at each date a fraction of life-time resources on current consumption. Wealth consists of
her previously accumulated ﬁnancial assets plus the present value of future pension and
transfer entitlements. Reﬂecting mortality risk, retirees have a higher marginal propensity
to consume out of life-time wealth than workers.6
In choosing consumption, savings and labor supply today, workers anticipate how these
decisions aﬀect their welfare during retirement. At any given date, a worker retires with
probability 1 − ω and remains active only with probability ω. Once an agent retires, her
worker’s salary is replaced by a lower pension payment so that her expected utility jumps
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During their active period, agents enjoy utility from consumption CW
v,t but incur disutility
from work eﬀort et when employed with probability nE
v,t,a n de ﬀort ξt expended on job
search when unemployment with probability nU
v,t.W o r ka n ds e a r c he ﬀorts will turn out
to be the same for all dynasties, i.e. ev,t = et. An agent’s ex ante employment probability




6This corresponds quite well with the ﬁnding of Harrison, Lau and Williams (2002) that retired people
have higher discount rates than active ones.
11The utility costs of both types of eﬀort, ϕ(e) and ψ(ξ), are convex and increasing
functions of the respective eﬀort levels. In assuming separable preferences, we eliminate
income eﬀects on labor supply. Therefore, an agent’s instantaneous welfare is QW
v,t as
in (3). It is again chosen as a fraction of life-time resources which consist of previously
accumulated ﬁnancial assets, the present value of future transfer entitlements, the value of
pension entitlements accumulated up to the present period (pension wealth), and human
wealth. A worker’s human wealth is the present value of expected wage related income
consisting of an average of wages net of (implicit) taxes and unemployment beneﬁts.
Human wealth can also be expressed as the average of the asset values V E and V U
attached to the states of (un-)employment, HW
v,t = V E
t nE
v,t + V U
t nU
v,t.
3.1.3 Aggregate Household Behavior
We state here only the macroeconomic magnitudes which obtain by summing over all age




















Workers are either employed or unemployed, giving NW
t = NE
t +NU
t in the aggregate.
Due to job separation at an exogenous rate s, the number of employed declines by sNE
t ,
leaving only a fraction 1 − s in employment. On the other hand, successful job search
of the unemployed raises employment. Given that a unit of search eﬀort locates a job
with probability ft, an agent raises her employment prospects (probability ξtft)b ys u p -
plying search eﬀort ξt. Therefore, ξtftNU
t and sNE
t reﬂect the inﬂow and outﬂow from
employment. Labor market ﬂows are as in Pissarides (2000) but include demographic
components as well. Employment and unemployment shrink by a factor ω on account of
retirement. On the other hand, the workforce is expanded by new labor market entrants
NW
t+1,t+1. They start life being unemployed since they must ﬁrst search for a job before



















12A worker household receives an average ¯ y over net wages of employed members,
¡
1 − tW − tSS¢
weNE, and unemployment beneﬁts of the unemployed, zNU.W a g e s w
are subject to a tax at rate tW and to social security contributions tSS. Subtracting the
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If employed, a worker can raise her income in supplying increased work eﬀort e,a l -
though at a higher eﬀort cost. An unemployed agent may search more intensively for a job,
again at the expense of disutility, and thereby raise her prospects of ﬁnding employment.




1 − tW − ˆ tSS¢
wtet − ϕ(et)+
£
(1 − s)V E






t + V U
t+1ω/Ω,w R
t ≡ zt − ψ(ξt)+ξtft
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where ˆ tSS is the eﬀective as opposed to the statutory rate tSS,a n dR =1+r is the
interest factor. The factor Ω > 1 reﬂects the individual valuation of the retirement risk
and leads to an increased discount rate of workers. The shadow price of employment V E
reﬂects current wages less disutility of eﬀort plus the expected value of next period where
the worker, if not retired, is still employed with probability 1−s but is separated from the
job with probability s, giving a lower value V U. The value of unemployment corresponds
to future reservation wages wR
t which consist of unemployment beneﬁts minus search eﬀort
cost plus the expected gains from ﬁnding (with probability ξtft)e m p l o y m e n t .
The presence of a tax beneﬁt link implies ˆ tSS <t SS. Intuitively, an agent anticipates
that earning higher wage income today adds to her stock of pension claims and raises
the pension in retirement. This extra beneﬁt corresponds to the part tSS − ˆ tSS of her
contribution payment. Only the part ˆ tSS is considered a tax without any corresponding
beneﬁt. This implicit tax reﬂe c t st h ef a c tt h a tc o n t r i b u t i o n sa r ef o r c e dr e t i r e m e n ts a v i n g s
that earn a lower rate of return than savings invested at the market rate of interest.
Naturally, the worker’s optimality conditions for work and search eﬀo r td e p e n do nt h e


















The marginal cost of work eﬀort, as measured in units of consumption, equals the marginal
return in terms of extra wage income net of taxes. Income eﬀects are absent due to
preferences being separable in consumption and eﬀort. In supplying ξt units of labor
market search, the agent expects to obtain a job oﬀer with probability ξtft. The expected
marginal return is the increase ft of the probability of ﬁnding a job times the expected
present value of the diﬀerential future wage income. Hence, the search cost ψ
0 is balanced
with the expected gains from ﬁnding a job.



































where zT represents a lump-sum transfer and E are social security beneﬁts, taxed at a
rate tP. Assets of retirees include net savings of the old plus the assets of new retirees





t and adds up across workers and retirees.
3.2 Production Sector
Firms invest, accumulate capital and hire labor on a search labor market.7 Some workers
retire and leave for other reasons of job separation which occurs at an exogenous rate
7To avoid complicated notation, we describe the most important transmission channels. The actual
simulation model as documented in Keuschnigg and Keuschnigg (2003) also includes other details such as
exogenous trend growth of labor productivity as well as adjustment costs J (I,K). The total investment
cost consists of market spending and internal adjustment costs, I + J.
14s.T h eﬁrm must thus continuously replace part of its workforce by hiring new workers.
When posting vacancies, it is able to ﬁll only part of them due to matching frictions. The
ﬁrm’s capital K and employment NE thus follow









where I is gross investment, δ t h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o n ,v the number of job vacancies and
q the hiring probability, or the fraction of vacancies that are successfully ﬁlled. The ﬁrm









t = Lt − κvt,L t = etN
E
t . (11)
Each worker supplies e hours of labor such that eﬀective employment is L.T h e ﬁrm
allocates a part LD of its manpower to production activities and must divert the rest κv
to recruitment of new workers. It thereby incurs search costs in terms of forgone output.
Investors value the ﬁrm because of its stream of dividends. After ﬁnancing investment











As h a r ezI of investment spending is tax deductible. The investment and hiring policy
generates dividends and capital gains, yielding a total return equal to rVt = χt + Vt+1 −
Vt. Taking as given the labor supply e per worker, ﬁrms accumulate employment and
equipment to maximize shareholder value. We derive the optimality conditions
(a) I : λ
K
t+1 =1 − tKzI,







The shadow prices λ
K = ∂V/∂K and λ
N = ∂V/∂N stand for the contribution of an extra


















15According to (13), investment is optimal if marginal investment cost, i.e. the net
acquisition price 1 − tKzI of capital goods, just matches the marginal beneﬁte q u a lt o
the shadow price λ
K




κFL is equal to the expected gains from search equal to
the probability ωqt of successful hiring times the shadow price of employment. We obtain
from (13-14) a particularly simple condition for optimal capital accumulation in the long-






. In a small open economy, the capital labor ratio
is entirely determined by the world interest rate and the system of capital income taxation.
3.3 Wages, Matching, and Unemployment
When an unemployed person and a ﬁrm with a vacancy meet, a job surplus is to be divided
among them. Filled jobs have higher value than vacancies from the ﬁrm’s perspective and
an employed worker is valued higher than an unemployed worker from the household’s
view, i.e. V E
t −V U
t > 0. The mutual gains from employment at a given wage are reﬂected
in the asset price equations (7) and (14.b). Taking φ as the worker’s bargaining power,
the division of the surplus of a particular worker-ﬁrm pair is determined by Nash wage
bargaining: wi











. Bargaining yields a wage rate, per
unit of eﬀort supplied, that is a weighted average of the worker’s contribution to the
ﬁrm’s proﬁts, i.e. the marginal product of labor FL, and the worker’s reservation wage
wR. The reservation wage in (7) importantly depends on the unemployment beneﬁt,
corrected for search eﬀort costs and augmented by the expected capital gain of ﬁnding
employment elsewhere. The inﬂuence of taxes on wage formation largely depends on
whether unemployment beneﬁts are indexed to net wages or not. With full indexation,
wages are proportional to the marginal product of labor and are rather ﬂexible. Indexation
thus tends to eliminate the eﬀects of taxes on equilibrium unemployment. If indexation is
absent and unemployment beneﬁts are kept constant in real terms, the worker’s outside
option is no longer reduced when the wage tax is increased. Consequently, the tax is
shifted to employers and raises the gross wage. This tax shifting reduces the returns to
16job creation and results in a higher equilibrium unemployment rate. In our simulations
below, we assume partial indexation leading to an intermediate tax shifting.
By deﬁnition, employment of households must be equal to employment in ﬁrms, see
(5) and (10). With large numbers, the individual probability ξtft to locate a job is
equal to the fraction of all job seekers that ﬁnd employment. By the same reason, the
probability qt is the fraction of job vacancies that are successfully ﬁlled in equilibrium.
Employment in the household and production sectors evolves identically only if inﬂows
into employment are the same for households and ﬁrms, ξtft ·NU
t = mt = qt ·vt.G i v e na








vacancies over eﬀective job seekers determines the transition rates q(θ) and f (θ)=θq(θ)
where f0 (θ) > 0 >q 0 (θ).A h i g h e r r a t i o θ indicates a tighter labor market and thus
reduces the prospects of ﬁrms to hire workers but raises the chances of unemployed to
ﬁnd a job.
Finally, we derive the Beveridge curve. If we assume demographic stationarity, the
entry of new workers just replaces the outﬂow due to retirement, NW
t+1,t+1 =( 1− ω)NW.
Using this and dividing (5) by NW yields nU
t+1 =1− ω + sω + ω[1 − s − ξtf (θt)]nU
t .I n
stationary labor market equilibrium, the unemployment rate is, thus,
n
U =
1 − ω + sω
1 − (1 − s − ξf (θ))ω
. (15)
Unemployment falls with increased incentives for job search (higher ξ) or with increased
labor market tightness on account of higher returns to job creation (higher θ).8
3.4 Public Sector and Current Account






t = Et. (16)
8I ft h e r ew e r en od e m o g r a p h i ce x i tr a t e( ω =1 ) and search intensity were constant (ξ =1 ), equation
(15) would reduce to the standard case of nU = s/(s + f) as in Pissarides (2000, p. 18).
17The left hand side reports revenues from contributions plus government subsidies TP to
the pension system. These transfers are ﬁnanced out of general tax revenue to cover
potential deﬁcits of the system. The right-hand side represents aggregate pension beneﬁts
of all retirees of diﬀerent age cohorts. On an individual level, pensions are linked to past
wages via an individually known replacement rate rP. Supplying more work today raises
wages and thereby boosts pension income during retirement. For this reason, pension
contributions are only partly perceived as a tax, ˆ tSS <t SS.
The government collects taxes T on wage, pension income and proﬁt, and spends
on public consumption CG, unemployment beneﬁts zNU,i n t e r e s trDG on public debt,
transfers to households zTN (other than pensions), and on transfers TP to the pension
system. As part of the policy scenario, public debt is kept constant in per capita terms.
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T h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n tr e ﬂects domestic savings and investment. Agents may invest
savings in three perfectly substitutable assets that must yield identical rates of return
in equilibrium if arbitrage is to be excluded. Private ﬁnancial wealth is, thus, A =
V +DG +DF,w h e r eV and DF stand for the value of equity and net foreign assets, and








4 Quantitative Eﬀects of Pension Reform
4.1 The Status Quo
Tables 2 and 3 characterize the current state of the Austrian economy prior to aging
and pension reform. The ﬁrst table shows key structural parameters, the second one
describes the parameters of the pension system in the model. Note that the model is
implemented quarterly to capture the fast labor market dynamics. While the quarterly
18interest rate is 1.2%, the annual rate is (1 + r)
4 − 1 ≈ 4.9%,i . e . r o u g h l yf o u rt i m e sa s
high. The behavioral parameters are largely standard in the CGE and RBC literature
and within the range of empirical estimates. Average unemployment duration is only 1.3
quarters, vacancies are ﬁlled already after 1.4 quarters, and average tenure on the job is
24.2 quarters or about six years. We use a Cobb Douglas production technology. GDP
shares of demand components and factor cost shares reﬂect Austrian data.
Table 2: Structural Parameters
real interest rate∗ r 0.012
depreciation rate∗ δ 0.026
intertemp.el.of subst. σC 0.400
relative m.p.c.∗∗   1.800
labor supply elasticity σL 0.400
search elasticity σS 0.400
job duration∗ 1/s 24.207
unempl.duration∗ 1/ξf 1.290
vacancy duration∗ 1/q 1.400
unemployment rate u 0.058
repl.rate unempl.ben. b 0.500
*) Per quarter/in quarters. **) marginal
propensity to consume retirees/workers.
σL = φ
0/(eφ
00), σS = ψ
0/(ξψ
00).
The demographic parameters determine a steady state prior to simulating the aging
scenario. Starting with age 20, agents are assumed to work on average until age 59.2,
the average retirement age in Austria prior to reform. The remaining life-expectancy
covers another 17.8 years, or 71.2 quarters, so that life-expectancy is 77 years prior to
the aging scenario. The stationary retiree worker ratio therefore amounts to 45.4 percent.
The other parameters of the pension system are discussed in section 2, except that the
implicit tax rate is endogenously computed in the calibrated initial steady state. In the
19model simulations below, the wage tax rate tW is endogenously adjusted to satisfy the
government budget constraint while all other policy parameters are exogenously speciﬁed.
Further, the required contribution rate tSS, implying an implicit tax rate ˆ tSS,i sc o m p u t e d
so that the pension system breaks even for a given size of government transfers TP.
Table 3: Parameters of Pension System
expected working period∗ (1 − ω)−1 156.800
expected retirement period∗ (1 − γ)−1 71.200
retirees-workers ratio NR/N W 0.454
replacement rate rP 0.781
pension tax rate tP 0.142
social security tax rate tSS 0.205
implicit s.s. tax rate ˆ tSS 0.037
transfer (percent of GDP) TP 2.500
*) Per quarter/in quarters. **) marginal propen-
sity to consume of retirees relative to workers.
4.2 Policy Scenarios
We now apply our model to simulate the economic consequences of aging and to assess the
long-run eﬀects of some measures to reform the Austrian pension system. Our analysis is
in two steps and ﬁrst addresses aging of the population. Then we sequentially consider
several policy initiatives for pension reform. The columns of Table 4 follow this sequence.
• Aging: Column LIFE in Table 4 raises life expectancy by 4.2 years so that the
expected life-span is 81.2 instead of 77 years. At the same time, the inﬂow of new
generations is adjusted such that overall population size remains constant. Given
that the average retirement age is not changed, life-time extension raises the retiree
worker ratio substantially from .45 to .55. Column AGE additionally allows for an
20increase of the overall population by 6% which results from a positive immigration
balance and increased fertility.
• Lower replacement rate: The replacement rate calculates pensions as a fraction
of acquired pension points that reﬂect average past wage earnings. The scenario of
column REPL cuts down the replacement rate from 0.78 to 0.7 and thereby makes
pensions much less generous.
• Raising retirement age: Aging results in an increased number of retirees per
active worker and thereby makes the pension system unsustainable in its current
form. Increasing the retirement age reverses the increase in the dependency ratio
and is an obvious strategy to restore the viability of the system. Column RET
of Table 4 reports the eﬀects of raising the average retirement age by three years
(12 quarters) which is complemented by a reduction of the length of the retirement
period by three years as well.
Table 4 computes these scenarios in sequential and cumulative form. Columns LIFE
and AGE compare with the initial steady state prior to demographic change where AGE
includes both shocks simultaneously, i.e. a larger population and a longer life-span. The
last four columns start from the AGE scenario and compare the eﬀects of various shocks
relative to this (non-stationary) baseline. The measures must be understood cumulatively
so that the last column reports the percentage changes relative to the AGE baseline when
all reform measures are implemented together.
4.3 Long-run Eﬀects
4.3.1 Aging
We ﬁr s ti n v e s t i g a t et h ee ﬀects of increasing life expectancy. Column LIFE in Table 4
reports the long-run results. As the average retirement age is held constant, the retiree
worker ratio increases substantially from .45 to .55. With overall population size ﬁxed,
21aging reduces the workforce and raises the number of pensioners. These demographic
changes have profound eﬀects on the public sector. Apart from pensions which are earn-
ings related, other government expenditure is kept constant per capita of the overall
population. With a rather dramatically shrinking workforce (see the reduction in employ-
ment), the wage tax base contracts and thereby necessitates a remarkable increase in the
tax rate by 15 percentage points to fund government spending. The social security contri-
bution must increase as well, raising the implicit tax by 3 percentage point which further
adds to the labor tax distortion. Obviously, a tax increase of this size constitutes a strong
disincentive to work, see (8). When employed, agents work fewer hours so that labor sup-
ply e per worker shrinks by more than 10 percent. The increase in the market wage is not
very pronounced, however, so that labor supply decisions are dominated by the change
in the wage tax. Given the large labor supply reduction and the almost constant market
wage, wage income declines. Workers thus accumulate fewer pension points. Given a ﬁxed
replacement rate under existing beneﬁt rules, the decline in wage income also translates
into lower pensions. Per capita pensions decline by 11.8% and thereby limit the increase
in the statutory contribution rate to 4.5 percentage points. The implicit social security
tax rate increases along with it from 3.7 to 7.1%.
Why is the wage increase so small? In a small open economy, real interest is interna-
tionally ﬁxed which prevents any long-run eﬀect on the capital labor ratio and on labor
productivity as is explained at the end of subsection 3.2. This tends to keep the wage
rate constant. With wage bargaining, wages also depend on the worker’s reservation wage
which is largely determined by unemployment beneﬁts. Since beneﬁts are, by assump-
tion, only partially indexed, they fall by less than the net of tax wage.9 In weakening
the worker’s outside option, the reduction in unemployment beneﬁts translates into lower
wages. On the other hand, bargaining tends to shift taxes to employers as long as beneﬁts
are only partially indexed, see the discussion in section 3.3, and thereby tends to raise
wages. The net eﬀect is a small increase in the equilibrium wage.
9We compute real unemployment beneﬁts by z =0 .5 × b ×
¡
1 − tW − tSS¢
w +0 .5 × z0,w h e r ez0 is
the initial beneﬁt level prior to the shock.
22At ﬁrst sight, it seems rather surprising that aging impairs search eﬀort so much
more than hours worked. Search intensity declines by more than 18%! To understand
incentives for job search, one compares in (8) the marginal cost of an extra search unit
with the marginal beneﬁt. The return to search is equal to the probability that one unit
of search locates a job, times the capital gain derived from trading in the unemployed
status for a job. The capital gain, V E − V U, equals the present value of the diﬀerential
future wage income over the value of unemployment beneﬁts, both corrected for work and
search eﬀort respectively.10 Both fewer working hours and much higher taxes accumulate
to substantially reduce the net of tax wage income derived from accepting a job. The
opportunity cost of accepting employment also declines but considerably less so since
unemployment beneﬁts are, by assumption, only partially indexed to net wages and are
partly tied to the initial beneﬁt level prior to the shock. Therefore, taxes together with
the unemployment beneﬁt rule clearly impairs the returns to search.
Further, because higher taxes reduce hours worked, they also cut into the ﬁrm’s job
r e n ta sg i v e ni n( 1 4 b ) .T h ev a l u eλ
N of a ﬁlled job and thus the return to job creation in
(13b) declines while the opportunity cost of recruitment, the lost output when part of the
w o r kf o r c em u s tb ed i v e r t e df r o mp r o d u c t i o nto job search, remains constant. Obviously
then, ﬁrms cut back on hiring and open fewer vacancies. Labor market tightness θ relaxes
(from 1.08 to 0.84 in Table 4) which raises the probability q of ﬁrms to successfully ﬁll a
vacancy until the returns and costs of recruitment are equal again. Unemployed workers,
however, will ﬁnd it much more diﬃcult to locate a job opportunity. Both the negative
capital gains and the lower matching probability reinforce each other to seriously impair
the returns to job search in (8). Consequently, aging leads to a much larger reduction
in search eﬀort than in hours worked when employed. Lower labor market tightness
and weaker search eﬀort both reduce the outﬂow from unemployment by eroding the
transition rate ξf (θ). By (15), the unemployment rate picks up, and according to Table
4, it increases quite remarkably by two percentage points, from 5.8 to 7.9%.
10The reader may verify this by taking the diﬀerence in (7).
23Equilibrium employment in production LD declines by 17.8%. This large decline
mostly reﬂects the demographic reduction in the work force and the decline in individual
labor supply. When the real interest rate is ﬁxed to world markets, the capital labor
ratio must remain constant in the long-run as well. Therefore, capital and output both
decline in proportion with labor demand. Average disposable wage income ¯ y as deﬁned
in (6) falls by more than 40%. This large eﬀect results mainly from the increase in
taxes, the reduction in individual labor supply, the reduction in unemployment beneﬁts
due to partial indexation to net wages, and a smaller workforce. There is a further
compositional eﬀect resulting from the higher unemployment rate: a larger share of the
workforce collects low unemployment beneﬁts while a smaller part earns high net wages.
Finally, the reduction in worker consumption per capita mostly reﬂects the large decline
in disposable wage income. With earnings related pensions and fewer assets inherited
from the active working period, consumption per pensioner declines by an amount not
that much lower than consumption per worker.
Column AGE in Table 4 completes the aging scenario by also allowing for a long-run
increase of the population by 6%. Demographic projections assume a higher fertility rate
and a positive migration balance for Austria. Since the length of work and retirement
periods are kept constant relative to column LIFE, the worker retiree ratio does not
change. The population is simply scaled up in the long-run without any eﬀect on the
age structure. One ﬁnds that all tax rates, ratios and variables in per capita terms are
exactly the same as in column LIFE. Only aggregate variables change. The increase in
population partly oﬀsets the decline of the workforce due to aging. Labor demand thus
declines only by 13 as compared to 18% in column LIFE. With a constant capital labor
ratio, the capital stock changes by exactly the same amount. The lower decline in average
wage income similarly reﬂects the smaller reduction of the workforce.
244.3.2 Cutting the Replacement Rate
The pension reform experiments take the aging scenario as the new baseline. We com-
pute percentage changes relative to the equilibrium in column AGE. The ﬁrst scenario
includes both (i) an elimination of the budget subsidy TP to the pension system together
with (ii) a reduction in the replacement rate. As to the ﬁrst part, the PAYG system
in Austria receives considerable transfers from the general budget and is, thus, not self-
sustained. When these subsidies are entirely eliminated, one can obviously cut the wage
tax to balance the general government budget while contributions must increase to sus-
tain the PAYG system. Given that the implicit tax rate is much lower than the statutory
contribution rate, one might have expected that replacing the wage tax by less distorting
contribution rates alleviates the negative incentive eﬀects on work and search eﬀort. This
is not so, however. The government budget position improves and allows for a 4.7 per-
centage point cut in the wage tax. The pension system, in contrast, requires an increase in
the statutory contribution rate of exactly the same amount. Further, the eﬀective social
security tax rate also increases by exactly the same number of percentage points. Since
the incentive eﬀects hinge on the net wage,
¡
1 − tW − ˆ tSS¢
w,t h eo ﬀsetting changes in
(eﬀective) tax rates exactly cancel and remain without eﬀect on the economy. Except for
the adjustments in tax rates, the results are fully identical with those in column AGE and
a r et h u sn o ts e p a r a t e l ys h o w n .
The replacement rate ties pensions of retirees to their previous working salaries, taken
as an average over past net wage earnings. Column REPL reports the long-run eﬀects
when (i) the budget subsidy is eliminated and (ii) the replacement rate is cut from 0.78 to
0.7. With no further demographic adjustment, the retiree worker ratio is the same in both
cases. The most obvious eﬀect of cutting the replacement rate is the reduction of pension
payments per capita which are down by approximately 5.5%. This is a considerable step
towards ﬁnancial viability of the pension system and allows for a 3 percentage point
reduction of contribution rates. This relieve does not suﬃce to compensate for the rate
increase necessitated by the elimination of the budget subsidy. Compared to the post
25aging state, the contribution rate increases on net by more than one percentage point to
.251+.047−.03 = 26.8%.T h eeﬀective social security tax rate, in contrast, picks up by a
full 3.6 percentage points since both the higher statutory rate and the lower replacement
rate eﬀectively reduce the rate of return and therefore inﬂate the tax component of any
unit of contributions paid.
Table 4: Long-Run Macroeconomic Eﬀects
Variables ISS LIFE* AGE* REPL# RET#
ret.-worker ratio 0.454 0.552 0.552 0.552 0.446
tSS contribution rate 0.205 0.251 0.251 0.268 0.219
ˆ tSS implicit s.s.tax 0.037 0.071 0.071 0.107 0.069
tW wage tax rate 0.205 0.353 0.353 0.258 0.135
rP replacement rate 0.781 0.781 0.781 0.703 0.703
θ vacancy ratio 1.085 0.842 0.842 0.924 1.111
u unempl. rate 5.800 7.908 7.908 7.058 5.510
K capital stock -17.879 -12.952 4.944 25.381
LD labor demand -17.879 -12.952 4.944 25.381
w gross wage 0.075 0.075 -0.025 -0.004
e labor supply -10.375 -10.375 4.007 13.788
ξ search intensity -18.980 -18.980 7.946 27.067
¯ y average income -43.299 -39.897 23.848 98.045
E pension p.c. -11.790 -11.790 -5.554 6.312
CW worker cons. p.c. -37.297 -37.297 22.591 79.908
CR retiree cons. p.c. -29.641 -29.641 18.295 66.354
ISS: Initial steady state, absolute values. LIFE: Life expectancy higher
by 4.2 years, constant population. AGE: increased population due to
immigration. REPL: reduction of pension replacement rate plus elim-
ination of PAYG deﬁcit TP. RET: Increased retirement age. Upper
half: absolute values; lower half: percentage changes. *) percentage
change relative to ISS. #) percentage change relative to AGE.
26Labor supply incentives hinge on the eﬀective rather than the statutory social security
tax rate. Since the total tax wedge tW +ˆ tSS falls by 5.9 percentage points relative to the
aging scenario, workers supply more hours. Compared to column AGE, labor supply
increases by 4%. Search incentives again respond more sensitively for the same reasons
as discussed in the aging scenario. The lower labor tax burden made feasible by the cut
in pension beneﬁts directly boosts search incentives. In addition, when each employee
works more hours, the job rent to the ﬁrm increases and induces her to hire more actively.
By raising the matching probability of unemployed, a tighter labor market strengthens
incentives for job search on top of the direct tax eﬀects. The unemployment rate starts to
fall. The ﬁscal budget is quite favorably aﬀected when unemployment is lower and when
other taxes generate more revenues (employment, capital and output increase by almost
ﬁve percentage points). When the extra tax revenue is used to further cut the wage tax,
the stimulus to labor supply and investment gets reinforced. This allows in equilibrium
to cut the wage tax from 35 to 26%. The tax cut contributes to a lower unemployment
rate which falls by almost one percentage point, from 7.9 to 7.06%.
4.3.3 Raising Retirement Age
A prominent reform proposal is to raise the retirement age. This measure does not change
the overall size of the population but importantly aﬀects its composition. The workforce
expands and the number of retirees declines. Since eﬀective retirement age is rather low
in Austria, we consider in column RET a relatively large increase by three years. A larger
part of overall life-time is spent working, and a smaller part is reserved for retirement.
Consequently, the retiree worker ratio falls considerably, and is even slightly smaller than
prior to aging. Essentially, the demographic eﬀect of this scenario is aging in reverse, with
very beneﬁcial eﬀects on the government budget and pension system.
Table 4 reports in column RET the combined, cumulative eﬀects that obtain upon
implementing all three measures. All wage related tax rates fall, both the wage tax as
well as statutory and eﬀective social security taxes. The wage tax rate falls by additional
27twelve percentage points relative to REPL, and is less than half the rate in the baseline
AGE scenario. Consequently, work and search incentives markedly improve. The unem-
ployment rate falls by 1.55 percentage points to a value as low as 5.5% which is a total
reduction by 2.4 percentage points relative to the post aging baseline. Driven be aggregate
labor supply, this scenario strongly expands the economy. Employment, capital and out-
p u ti n c r e a s eb ya l m o s taq u a r t e ri nt h el o n g - r u n ,c o m p a r e dt ot h ep o s ta g i n ge q u i l i b r i u m .
Three factors drive the aggregate labor supply expansion. First, later retirement expands
the workforce for purely demographic reasons. Second, the strong ﬁscal savings allow to
cut the combined wage tax burden tW +ˆ tSS by more than 20 percentage points, down to
20.4% from 42.4% in the post aging baseline. Obviously, this huge policy shock strongly
expands individual labor supply by 13.8%. Finally, with wage taxes eﬀectively cut in
half, the unemployed vigorously expand their job search which tightens up labor markets
and boosts the outﬂow from unemployment. Consequently, the unemployment rate falls
markedly and thereby again raises employment. Taking all three factors together adds up
to a formidable job expansion which is frictionlessly accompanied by capital accumulation
in a small open economy. The long-run increases in average disposable wage income and
consumption per capita of workers and retirees are correspondingly large.
4.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis should trace out the range of potential results and should identify
those parameters and behavioral margins that can importantly change the magnitude of
the quantitative eﬀects. Although the chosen parameters are well within the range of
econometric estimates, they do vary quite substantially in the empirical literature. We
have thus recomputed the long-run eﬀects of our most comprehensive scenario to check
sensitivity with respect to a few key parameters. Table 5 ﬁrst repeats the stationary
initial equilibrium prior to the aging shock (column ISS) and reports in column RET the
cumulative eﬀects of aging and pension reform. While the tax rates in the upper half
of column RET in Table 5 are the same as in column RET of Table 4, the percentage
28changes are now expressed relative to the ISS rather than the post aging equilibrium as in
Table 4, and are therefore much smaller since aging and pension reform oﬀset each other
to a considerable extent.
Given the emphasis on labor market eﬀects, we ﬁrst turn to the case of a more sensitive
labor supply response. Comparing column σL with RET shows that the labor supply
response very importantly determines the magnitude of the quantitative eﬀects. When
the elasticity is increased from .4 to .6, the eﬀect on labor supply per capita more than
doubles in equilibrium. We also ﬁnd an important interaction with search eﬀort which
responds now much more vigorously, increasing by 6.6 rather than 2.9%, even though the
search elasticity is kept the same. The eﬀe c ti sr a t h e ri n t u i t i v e .W i t hm o r eh o u r sw o r k e d ,
the value of a job must rise relative to the value of being unemployed. Unemployed agents
must thus expect a bigger gain in locating a job which strongly boosts the incentives for
job search. With higher search intensity, the unemployment rate falls more pronouncedly
(to 5.2 instead of 5.5 percent) and aggregate employment expands more vigorously. It
may be surprising at ﬁrst sight that a higher search elasticity σS ( f r o m. 4t o. 6 )i n ﬂuences
the quantitative response to a much smaller extent. For any given return to job search, a
higher elasticity will surely strengthen the search activity which expands by 4.1 instead
of 2.9%. For this reason, the unemployment rate falls by more than in RET due to more
intensive job search. In contrast to the case of a higher labor supply elasticity, the gains
from accepting a job are not much aﬀected. Therefore, this scenario holds only limited
potential to magnify the overall macroeconomic response which is only slightly stronger.
The rule for unemployment beneﬁts is z =0 .5×b×
¡
1 − tW − tSS¢
w+0.5×z0 in the
base case where z0 is the initial beneﬁt level prior to the shock and b is the replacement
rate for unemployment compensation. Column UB1 considers an alternative scenario
where real unemployment beneﬁts remain constant at z = z0. The worker’s outside
option largely remains ﬁxed in this case, so that wage taxes get fully shifted to employers
and boost gross wages. Since the full pension reform allows a considerable reduction in
the wage tax rate, falling from 20 to 13% roughly, the market wage increases less than
29in column RET. This strengthens job creation and aggregate employment, allowing for a
smaller tax rate which suﬃces to stimulate labor supply and job search to some extent.
The unemployment rate correspondingly falls somewhat more, from 5.8 to 5.3%, instead
of 5.5% in column RET. The other extreme allows for full indexation of beneﬁts to net
w a g e sa si nc o l u m nU B 2 ,z = b ×
¡
1 − tW − tSS¢
w. I nt h i sc a s e ,t a xs h i f t i n gi sl a r g e l y
excluded. Consequently, employers beneﬁt less from the wage tax reduction that is made
possible by the reform. Full indexation thus retards job creation and employment but
rather strengthens wage growth. The expansion is more moderate and the unemployment
rate falls only to a minor extent.
Table 5: Sensitivity Analysis
Variables ISS RET σL σS UB1 UB2 UB3
ˆ tSS implicit s.s.tax 0.037 0.069 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069
tW wage tax rate 0.205 0.135 0.113 0.134 0.132 0.139 0.134
u unempl. rate 5.800 5.510 5.181 5.473 5.312 5.711 5.355
LD labor demand 9.142 12.433 9.253 9.444 8.827 9.300
w gross wage 0.071 0.058 0.086 0.002 0.136 0.013
e labor supply 1.983 4.706 2.034 2.112 1.847 2.013
ξ search intensity 2.949 6.622 4.066 4.825 1.140 4.373
ISS: Steady state prior to aging. RET: Base Case Scenario, aging plus pension
reform. σL: labor supply elasticity up from .4 to .6. σS: search elasticity up
from .4 to .6. UB1: constant unemployment beneﬁts. UB2: full indexation
of unemployment beneﬁts. UB3: replacement rate for unemployment beneﬁts
up from b = .5 to .7, bargaining power of ﬁrms down from φ = .5 to .3. Upper
half: absolute values. Lower half: percentage changes.
We ﬁnally investigate the quantitative eﬀects of pension reform when a higher replace-
ment rate for unemployment compensation is in place (see column UB3). To allow for a
higher replacement rate, our calibration procedure also requires to reduce the bargaining
power of ﬁrms φ in order to replicate the benchmark data. Compared to the base case
value of one half, bargaining power of ﬁrms is reduced to φ = .3 in the scenario of column
UB3. Consequently, wage taxes get shifted to a larger extent which also works in the
reverse direction, i.e. lower taxes lead to lower wages. For this reason, wage increase is
30now much less pronounced than in column RET, labor demand expands accordingly, and
the unemployment rate falls by more than in column RET.
To sum up, the quantitative response to pension reform seems to be quite robust to
changes of some important behavioral parameters. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in labor
supply and even more so in the search intensity. However, while the size of the long-run
eﬀects are sensitive to some key parameters of the model, such parameter variations are
rather unlikely to change the qualitative nature of our results.
4.4 Transitional Eﬀects
Figures 1-3 summarize the transitional dynamics for a few key labor market indicators:
the tax distortion tW + ˆ tSS, the unemployment rate u and aggregate labor supply L =
eNE.11 The transitional solution reﬂects several dynamic forces. First, all variables must
eventually move into the direction of the long-run changes as indicated in Table 4. Second,
stock variables will usually start out from initial conditions and move monotonically
towards long-run values. Third, however, stock variables may potentially evolve non-
monotonically if some subsystems are governed by rather diﬀerent adjustment speeds. In
our model, for example, labor market dynamics is very fast, with a half life of only a
few quarters. Investment takes much longer to adjust with a half life around seven years
while demographic change is a truly slow process that takes several decades. Fourth,
control variables such as hours worked or investment tend to jump instantaneously a big
step towards the new steady state and subsequently change monotonously even though
overshooting is possible in certain scenarios.
11Note that Table 4, instead, reports LD = L − κv, see (11).














The aging scenarios are dominated by slow demographic change that keeps the econ-
omy for several decades in a transitional state. The scenario LIFE, for example, involves a
once and for all decrease in the mortality rate such that the expected retirement period is
prolonged. Given increased life expectancy, the retiree population starts growing slowly.
Since LIFE assumes hypothetically that the population remains constant, the workforce
must shrink as a consequence of an assumed decline in fertility which erodes the ﬂow of
newborns. This pattern is reﬂected in the trajectory LIFE of Figure 2. With a declining
number of wage tax payers and social security contributors combined with a growing num-
ber of pensioners, the ﬁscal situation deteriorates slowly such that the labor tax distortion
features an upward trend over a prolonged period of more than 60 quarters or 15 years.
Subsequently, the tax burden stabilizes. Figure 1 shows that the labor supply distortion
in the early adjustment period remains rather near the initial values prior to aging (line
ISS) and grows only when the demographic change is felt more strongly. Accordingly,
the detrimental labor supply eﬀects of the higher tax burden are rather weak in the early
32adjustment period and get larger only later on when tax disincentives are more severe
(see Table 4). Therefore, the aggregate labor supply (line LIFE in Figure 2) remains very
close to the initial state in the ﬁrst adjustment periods and starts to decline only after a
while, with the individual labor supply response magnifying the eﬀect of the demographic
supply eﬀect. On top of increased life expectancy, the scenario AGE additionally allows
for an increase in population by 6% in the long-run which is phased in by assuming an
accordingly larger inﬂow of newborns, reﬂecting somewhat higher fertility than in LIFE
and a positive inﬂow of migrants. For this reason, aggregate labor supply in Figure 2
declines by less than in LIFE. Table 4 shows that the retiree worker ratio and therefore
labor tax rates converge to the same long-run values. Accordingly, the labor tax distortion
increases much more slowly in Figure 1 but eventually converges after a long adjustment
period (not fully shown).
















To understand the dynamic adjustments of the next scenarios REPL and RET, one
must consider that they are implemented cumulatively so that RET includes REPL,
33see the discussion of Table 4. Therefore, we discuss ﬁrst the short-run consequences of
the scenario REPL, featuring an instantaneous and permanent reduction of the PAYG
replacement rate. This being a relieve to the pension system, why is then the labor tax
distortion jumping up instantaneously in Figure 1? In our model, the reduction in the
replacement rate aﬀects only new pensioners which makes the average per capita pension
basically a predetermined stock variable. This implies that the lower replacement rate
succeeds to reduce pension expenditures only very slowly since it takes a prolonged period
until the inﬂow of new pensioners changes the average pension expenditure per capita of
retirees. This limits the potential for cutting statutory tax rates in the early adjustment
phase. On the other hand, the implicit social security tax ˆ tSS jumps up immediately
since today’s workers must anticipate the less generous pension they will be oﬀered in the
future. This key anticipation eﬀect results in an instantaneous upward jump in the labor
tax distortion as shown in Figure 1.
Given that the lower replacement rate succeeds to squeeze pension expenditure only
very slowly, the tax distortion remains larger than in the AGE scenario for quite some
time, and falls below it only after more than a decade (about 50 quarters). Taking account
of the disincentive eﬀects of these higher eﬀective tax rates, aggregate labor supply under
this scenario is actually lower than in the post aging scenario for about the same time
span (compare lines AGE and REPL in Figure 2). Since the next scenario RET raises
retirement age on top of the reduction in the replacement rate, it similarly features an
upward jump in the tax wedge. Subsequently, however, this scenario is much more eﬀective
and faster in reducing the tax distortion and therefore succeeds to expand aggregate labor
supply much faster.















We ﬁnally turn to unemployment dynamics which results both from demographic
eﬀects and tax incentives. In Figure 3, our demographic scenarios ﬁrst lead to a decline
in the unemployment rate while in the long-run, it is considerably higher than in the
initial equilibrium. We have already argued that the slow but eventually large increases
in tax rates ultimately lead to higher unemployment. In the short-run, however, the drop
in fertility as part of the LIFE scenario reduces quite substantially the arrival of new
workers and thus the inﬂow into unemployment. This demographic eﬀect reduces the
unemployment rate for a while but eventually the tax disincentives for work and search
start to dominate, leading to a prolonged period of increasing unemployment rates. This
initial demographic eﬀect is less pronounced in the AGE scenario where the mass of labor
market entrants is necessarily higher and the inﬂow into unemployment larger as compared
to LIFE. In the subsequent phase, unemployment rates increase less dramatically because
t h et a xd i s t o r t i o ng r o w sm u c hm o r es l o w l ya si se v i d e n tf r o mF i g u r e1 .
35When implementing a lower replacement rate in the post aging equilibrium (line RET
in Figure 3), we have argued before that the eﬀective labor tax wedge jumps up rather
immediately as workers must anticipate less generous pensions and ﬁnd that a larger share
of their contributions amounts to being a tax. Since higher eﬀective labor taxes discourage
search eﬀort on the part of unemployed, this scenario leads to an immediate increase in
unemployment rates. Since the scenario RET includes a lower pension replacement rate, it
leads to a short-run increase in unemployment rates for the same reasons. RET, however,
additionally includes a postponed retirement age and therefore succeeds to reduce the
structural unemployment rate in the long-run. This scenario therefore holds the potential
for opposite short- and long-run eﬀects on unemployment.
4.5 Generational Welfare
The preceding analysis has shown a rather impressive impact of demographic change and
pension reform. It takes several decades, however, before the full eﬀects are seen. Welfare
eﬀects should thus be large in the long-run but much more moderate in the short-run.
Like public debt, pension reform importantly redistributes intergenerationally if there are
no oﬀsetting policy measures. Table 6 presents an intergenerational and aggregate welfare
analysis. As in the scenarios REPL and RET in Table 4, we consider the reduction of the
pension replacement rate and the mandated increase in retirement age. Table 6 presents
the wealth equivalent changes in life-time utility per generation and in the aggregate,
expressed in percent of life-time wealth. The Appendix explains the welfare measure. All
changes are compared to the AGE scenario.
According to Table 4, reducing the pension replacement rate implies a higher implicit
social security tax but allows for a much lower wage tax. The net eﬀect is a rather pro-
nounced reduction of the labor tax distortion in the long-run, leading to a signiﬁcant
expansion as well as a remarkable increase in disposable income and consumption. The
preceding section showed, however, that the short- and medium-run eﬀects are rather
unfavorable. It takes time until the budget relieve allows for a reduction in the wage tax
36while the increase in the implicit social security tax is immediate. As a consequence, the
labor tax distortion and unemployment ﬁrst increase while labor supply is discouraged.
The pattern of welfare changes in Table 6 is in line with these developments. The impact
on current old generations is insigniﬁcant since the policy change relates only to new gen-
erations. Present working generations are the losers. Since a lower replacement rate cuts
the private return on PAYG contributions, a larger part of the contributions represents
eﬀectively a tax. The pension rule simply becomes less favorable. On the other hand,
current workers are unable to share in the beneﬁts of improved labor market conditions
and growth since it takes too long before the wage tax cuts and the improvements in the
labor market take eﬀect. A currently newborn working generation thus suﬀers a welfare
loss equivalent to 4.4 percent of her life-time wealth.
Table 6: Welfare Eﬀects of Pension Reform
Old Generations New Generations Aggregate
Scenario* Retired Workers All old Current Future Welfare Change
REPL -0.164 -4.468 -3.169 -4.400 9.038 -2.926
RET 0.427 5.316 3.840 7.278 37.635 26.662
RETALL 0.238 1.043 0.800 3.070 40.168 22.438
*)Welfare change in percent of life-time resources. RET considers the increase
in retirement age in isolation while RETALL gives the cumulative eﬀect of both
scenarios and compares to column RET in Table 4.
The winners are future generations. Only after several decades do new generations
ﬁnd better conditions than they would have if the economy evolved along the initial AGE
equilibrium in the absence of the policy shock. In the very long-run, future generations
eventually gain quite impressively by an amount equivalent to 9 percent of life-time wealth.
The reduction in the replacement rate clearly redistributes from present to future working
generations. What is the net eﬀe c t ? T h el a s tc o l u m no fT a b l e6r e v e a l sas i g n i ﬁcant
aggregate welfare loss of about 2.7 percent averaged over all present and future generations
(see the Appendix for the deﬁnition of this measure). This negative eﬀect reﬂects the fact
that the welfare gains are concentrated only among new generations in the distant future
while all present as well as new generations over the next three decades loose signiﬁcantly.
37The next line in Table 6 reports the welfare eﬀects of an increase in the average
retirement age by three years, without changing the pension replacement rate. Already
Table 4 reveals that the eﬀects are several magnitudes larger. Despite of a constant
overall population, the scenario reduces the retiree worker ratio from .55 to .45 in the
long-run which results in a strong increase of aggregate labor supply. The vigorous output
expansion and the reduction in unemployment allow for sustainable government ﬁnances
with much lower wage taxes. The overall labor tax distortion falls by a full 15 percent.
These adjustments almost result in a doubling of disposable average wage income in the
very long-run. Consumption expands accordingly. Since the demographic labor supply
eﬀect occurs only very slowly, Table 6 reports large welfare gains for new generations born
in the distant future while the gains to current generations are much more moderate.
Again, retired generations are largely unaﬀected while existing workers gain by about
5.3 percent of life-time wealth, on average. The welfare gain of the presently new born
generation amounts to 7.3 percent of life-time resources, and increases continuously for
all new generations entering at a later date until the full beneﬁts are obtained for future
generations born into the new steady state. Interestingly, all age groups on average would
gain from this scenario although the gains are concentrated among future generations.
The last line in Table 6 runs both scenarios cumulatively as in the last column of Table
4. The results are understood by the ﬁrst two lines. With such large shocks, some non-
linearity is expected so that the two lines do not add up precisely to give the third line.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
Aging of the population has rendered the unfunded pension system unsustainable in its
current form and requires some larger policy initiatives for reform. The demographic labor
supply eﬀects of aging and the upward pressure on labor taxes should importantly aﬀect
labor market performance. This paper has presented a computable equilibrium model of
the Austrian economy. The model captures the essential aspects of the Austrian pension
system including a tax beneﬁt linkage and a calculation of the implicit tax component
38of social security contributions. It also contains a particularly detailed structure of the
labor market that explains the equilibrium structural unemployment rate as a balance
between the incentives of ﬁrms to create jobs and hire new workers and the incentives of
unemployed workers to search for jobs. Hours worked are also endogenously determined
and aﬀect job rents and ﬁrms’ incentives to create new jobs.
Applying this framework to aging and pension reform scenarios, we record several im-
portant results. First, aging can profoundly inﬂuence long-run structural unemployment
because it puts pressure on the ﬁscal system and thereby contributes to a secular increase
in the labor tax burden. Second, labor market eﬀects of pension reform can be quite
pronounced as well, not only via the classical mechanism of endogenous labor supply, but
also via its eﬀect on the incentives for job creation by ﬁrms and job search by unemployed
workers. This can easily involve 2 to 3 percentage points of the long-run unemployment
rate. Third, the intertemporal eﬀects of pension reform may result in opposite short- and
long-run adjustment of the unemployment rate. Fourth, the increase in retirement age
by about three years is a potent strategy to restore sustainability of the pension system
and can reverse a large part of the aging eﬀects. Fifth, in the absence of an explicit debt
policy to control for intergenerational redistribution, the gains from pension reform are
mostly to the beneﬁt of future generations. Being limited to new generations only, the
increase in retirement age has the potential to beneﬁt all generations, present and future.
Further work should address a number of issues. The modeling of the pension system
should be extended to allow for alternative institutional arrangements as well. Interesting
and also urgent policy scenarios include the introduction of individual accounts within
the current PAYG system that might help to strengthen the tax beneﬁt linkage and to
reduce the individual tax component of contributions. After introducing individual ac-
counts, one should investigate the economic consequences of a partial move to a funded
system. All these issues are more or less intensively discussed in Austria and elsewhere
(see, for example, the contributions in Holzmann and Stiglitz, 2001). It should be possible
to extend the current framework to capture these issues. Given the large model responses
39to demographic change, future work should also consider the sensitivity of existing popu-
lation projections which seem to allow for a range of developments and are sensitive with
regard to the assumed mortality, fertility and migration rates. Finally, pension reform in
other large economies with similar demographic developments may have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on worldwide savings and international capital markets. It would be thus important to
allow for an interest rate response from international capital markets in our small open
economy model.
Appendix: Welfare Calculus
Table 6 reports generational welfare changes. It can be shown that indirect utility in (2-3)
































We now index values referring to initial and new equilibria by an upper index, e.g. PW0
t
and PW1
t . Taking initial prices as a reference, the equivalent variation EV gives the wealth
equivalent change in welfare. It is deﬁned (separately for each generation) as
EV
W

















This per capita measure is easily aggregated. Table 6 reports the aggregate equivalent
variations per capita, and in percent of life-time wealth, for various generations in the
following order: 100 × EV R
1 /WR
1 , 100 × EV W
1 /WW
1 , 100 × EV O
1 /WO







1 , where the policy shocks occur in period t =1 .N e x t ,



























































tt is per capita, it must be multiplied by the size of the new cohort (while EV W
1
is already an aggregate of all present worker generations) and is discounted back to period
1 to compare with present old generations. In our computations, a new steady state is
attained in some ﬁnite period T. The second term is the welfare change from period T +1
to inﬁnity, derived from comparing the new with the initial steady state equilibrium.
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